

The Role of Web Hosting Providers in Detecting Compromised Websites

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Motivations



• Shared web hosting is used by millions of users

- Host personal and small business websites
- Users often have little or no security background
- Even experienced users have little control/visibility
- Millions of websites, unexperienced users, outdated/vulnerable web apps → huge attack surface!
- Hosting providers should play a key role in helping the user in case of a compromise
 - Is this the case?

Goal



- Study how shared web hosting providers handle the security of their customers
 - By **detecting the compromise** of their websites
 - By testing their **reactions to abuse complaints**
- We also tested six **specialized security services**
 - Provided as an add-on for hosting accounts
 - Monitor security issues on websites
 - For a small fee

Testing methodology (1/2)

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- **Register** multiple shared hosting accounts
- Install real web applications
- Simulate a number of **compromise scenarios**
 - Infected by botnet
 - Data exfiltration (SQL injection)
 - Phishing kit
 - Code inclusion (Drive-by-download)
 - Compromised account (upload of malicious files)
- Tests designed to be noisy and easily detectable

Testing methodology (2/2)

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- Phase 1: observe the provider's reaction
- Phase 2: send abuse complaints regarding our websites
 - Real complaints about phishing and malicious executables
 - Illegitimate complaints, about offending or malicious content, while the account was clean



Ethical Issues



- We used real vulnerabilities, a real phishing kit, and a real drive-by javascript code
- But
 - we modified the sources to be exploitable only by us (special parameters)
 - not indexable by search engines (robot.txt)
 - malicious content was not accessible from the web or disabled

Tested Providers



- 12 among the top global ones (mostly US-based)
- 10 regional ones
 - From Europe, US, India, Russia, Algeria, Hong Kong, Argentina, Indonesia
- 6 add-on security services
 - Less than 30 \$/month subscription fee
 - Two come in *basic* and *pro* version
 - 10 days detection threshold (we expected them to be quick at detecting security issues)

Scenarios details



- Infected by botnet
- Data exfiltration (SQL injection)
- Phishing kit
- Code inclusion (Drive-by-download)
- Compromised account (upload of malicious files)

Remote File Upload of a Phishing Kit



Setup

- OsCommerce installation mimicking a known Remote File Upload vulnerability
- Performs the upload a real Bank of America phishing kit (disabled back-end code)

Attack

- Attacker phase, run every 6 hours: uploads the phishing kit by triggering the vulnerability
- Victim phase, every 15': simulates a victim falling prey of the phishing attack
 - » The forms on the phishing pages are filled up with a set of fake personal details (manually pre-generated)

Compromised account (upload of known malicious files)


Setup

- Static HTML page with random English sentences and some pictures
- Two known malicious files (PHP and executable)
 - » c99.php: a real c99 web shell
 - » sb.exe: Ramnit worm
 - » Both detected by most antiviruses

Attack

- Uploads the two malicious files to the shared hosting account via FTP (attacker using stolen credentials)
- Run every 6 hours

Experiment scheme



Results



- Registration
- Attack prevention
- Compromise detection
- Response to abuse complaints

Results: registration



- Some providers **discourage abusive** user **registrations**
 - Phone calls, ID scan, 3rd party fraud protection services
- Global providers are more cautious than regional ones
 - 58% of them manually verified at least one of our accounts (10% for regional)
- Three regional providers have a very simple "1-step" signup process
 - Never verified our information upon registration


Results: prevention and detection

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
- Attack prevention measures work to some extent
 - URL blacklists to block SQL injections and File Uploads
 - » SQLi,SH, Phish in ~30% of the cases
 - Connection and OS-level filtering are effective (Bot)
 - Some providers seem to employ the same (commercial) rule sets for blocking attacks
- Attack detection results are quite disappointing
 - Only one provider was able to detect one of our attacks
 - Received alert for test AV after 17 days it was running

Results: abuse complaints


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- **64%** of the **replies** arrived **within one day** from the notification
- Average response delay:
 - 28h for global providers
 - **79h** for **regional** providers
- Wide variety of reactions...



- Only 3 providers out of 22 handled them well
- Some overreact (e.g., two of them terminated the user's account)
 - Others sent an ultimatum to the user, but then did not check whether the user did anything to clean up the account



- **14** providers **out of 19** tested behaved well
 - » Over estimation
- 3 (regional) providers believed the complaint without checking
 - completely **wrong decisions** (e.g., account suspension, file removal)

Detection by Security add-on Services

• Some of the services we tested had a partnership with a URL blacklisting service

 \rightarrow We intentionally got our malicious pages blacklisted

- Five out of six services did not detect anything
- One detected
 - the malicious files (through an antivirus scan) but they did NOT notify the user
 - the blacklisted malicious page

Conclusions



- Quite a **lot of effort** is spent in **preventing** malicious **registrations**
 - Especially from **global** providers
- Most providers employ **basic** mechanisms to **prevent** some kinds of **attack** (e.g., URL blacklists)
- Almost zero effort in detecting obvious signs of compromise
- Cheap security services are useless
- Half of the companies responded to complaints
 - Only 14% in the appropriate way

Thank you



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For further questions, suggestions, comments: canali@eurecom.fr